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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you go to a nearby electronics store to buy a 
DVD player.  At the store you find two very similar DVD 
players that meet your needs.  One costs $69.99; the other 
costs $79.99 but offers a $20 mail-in rebate.  Which one will 
you choose? 
If you are like most people, you will buy the $79.99 DVD 
player because when you compute its post-rebate price, it will 
seem like the better value.  However, that DVD player is a 
better value only if you later take the steps necessary to 
redeem the mail-in rebate. Unfortunately, you will probably 
never redeem the rebate because you will either forget about 
it, procrastinate until the deadline has passed, lose the 
receipt or UPC code, or later decide that the $20 rebate is not 
worth the redemption effort.  Indeed, almost 80% of rebate 
dollars go unclaimed, and the high percentage of unredeemed 
rebates appears to be a major reason for rebates’ use.1  As one 
retailer explained to The New York Times, “[m]anufacturers 
love rebates . . . [t]hey get people into stores, but when it 
comes time to collect, few people follow through.  And this is 
just what the manufacturer has in mind.”2 
Lawmakers and legal scholars have proposed various 
ways to protect consumers from their failure to redeem 
rebates.  These proposals vary dramatically in the degree to 
which they restrict consumer choice.  At the most restrictive 
end of the spectrum, lawmakers in several states have 
proposed legislation that would ban mail-in rebate offers 
altogether.3  This solution, however, would harm savvy 
 
 1. PROMOTION MARKETING ASSOCIATION, PMA MAIL-IN REBATE 
BENCHMARKING STUDY (May 1, 2005), https://pmalink.site-
ym.com/resource/resmgr/research_open/pmamailinrebate.htm [hereinafter 
REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY]. 
 2. Catherine Greenman, The Trouble With Rebates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 
1999, at G1.  See also Tim Silk & Chris Janiszewski, Managing Mail-in Rebate 
Promotions 8–9 (undated) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://warrington.ufl.edu/mkt/docs/janiszewski/Rebate.pdf 
(“Successful rebate promotions are also designed to limit the number of rebate-
dependent purchasers that attempt to redeem a rebate offer.”). 
 3. Cornelia Pechmann & Tim Silk, Policy and Research Related to 
Consumer Rebates:  A Comprehensive Review, 32 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 
255, 256 (2013). 
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consumers who save money on their purchases by redeeming 
rebates.  Several prominent legal scholars have argued that 
less restrictive, disclosure-based regulations could improve 
rebate-related purchase decisions without restricting 
consumer choice. Specifically, they propose requiring rebate 
offers to disclose the actual rebate redemption rates.4 
This proposal is just one example of the recent surge of 
interest in non-restrictive regulatory interventions that 
“nudge” people toward desired behaviors without foreclosing 
other choices.5  In fact, the Obama administration recently 
proposed a Social and Behavioral Science Team to help 
identify such interventions.6  Non-restrictive regulations are 
attractive to lawmakers and academics because they interfere 
less with free-market principles than do other regulatory 
approaches and better preserve consumer autonomy.7 
In addition to preserving consumer choice, redemption 
rate disclosures are an intuitively appealing solution to the 
widespread problem of consumers failing to redeem rebates.  
When faced with strong evidence of others’ redemption 
failures, consumers should realize that they themselves are 
also unlikely to redeem rebates. However, some scholars have 
expressed skepticism about the likely effectiveness of such 
disclosures,8 and there are no existing studies on the 
effectiveness of mandatory redemption rate disclosures. 
Our Article is the first to provide evidence on this issue.  
 
 4. Ian Ayres, Did you use that gift card or rebate?, MARKETPLACE  (Aug. 9, 
2007), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/did-you-use-gift-card-or-
rebate (“If sellers disclosed [mail-in rebate] redemption rates, then consumers 
could decide whether it’s worth the risk.”); Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, 
Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 93, 109 (2010).  See 
also Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection:  The Problem of 
Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1703 (2006), (“If, for 
example, consumers understood that they were not likely to obtain rebates, they 
would not take rebate offers into account in deciding whether to buy 
products . . . policymakers might require rebate offers to disclose that few 
consumers redeem similar rebates.”). 
 5. For example, the book Nudge:  Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness, which called for adoption of non-restrictive regulatory 
approaches was recently a New York Times bestseller. RICHARD H. THALER & 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, 
AND HAPPINESS (2008).  
 6. Katrin Bennhold, The Ministry of Nudges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2013, at 
BU 1. 
 7. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not 
an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003). 
 8. John G. Lynch Jr. & Gal Zauberman, When Do You Want It?  Time, 
Decisions, and Public Policy, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 67, 71–72 (2006). 
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Previous research on warnings and disclaimers in other 
domains shows that their effects are context-specific and 
difficult to predict.9  Specifically, some disclosures, such as 
on-product safety warnings, can be effective.10  However, 
other warning disclosures are ineffective11 or, even worse, 
boomerang and increase the undesirable behaviors they are 
meant to prevent.12  Uncertainty regarding the effects of 
rebate disclosures means that this issue is ripe for empirical 
examination. 
This Article presents the results of our experiment that 
investigates whether legally mandated disclosures decrease 
consumers’ optimism about redeeming mail-in rebates and 
their willingness to purchase rebated products.  The 
experiment examines the effects of two different rebate 
disclosures on 549 U.S. consumers.  One disclosure directly 
tests whether consumers who are made aware of low rebate 
redemption rates are less likely to purchase rebated products.  
This disclosure (the “Redemption Rate Disclosure”) states 
that “sales records show rebate redemption rates of 
approximately 30% for rebates of this type and size.”  The 
other disclosure attempts to temper consumers’ optimism 
about rebate redemption by explicitly warning them about 
overoptimism and the reasons for it.  Specifically, this 
“Overoptimism Disclosure” states that “[s]tudies show that 
people often overestimate the probability that they will redeem 
a mail-in rebate because they fail to anticipate that they will 
forget, procrastinate, lose the necessary materials, or later 
decide it is not worth the effort.” 
The experiment’s results indicate that neither the 
 
 9. David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin, Intended and Unintended 
Consequences of Warning Messages: A Review and Synthesis of Empirical 
Research, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 1, 1–2 (1994). 
 10. Eli P. Cox III, Michael S. Wogalter, Sara L. Stokes, & Elizabeth J. 
Tipton Murff, Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior? A Meta-Analysis, 
16 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 195, 201 (1997). 
 11. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665–79 (2011); Kesten C. Green & J. Scott 
Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclaimers in Advertising, 31 
J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 293, 302 (2012); Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmiter, & 
Ahmed E. Taha, Worthless Warnings? Testing the Effectiveness of Disclaimers in 
Mutual Fund Advertisements, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 429, 429 (2010). 
 12. Debra Jones Ringold, Boomerang Effect: In Response to Public 
Interventions: Some Unintended Consequences in the Alcoholic Beverage Market, 
25 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 27, 51–52 (2002); Stewart & Martin, supra note 9, at 12–
13.   
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Redemption Rate Disclosure nor the Overoptimism Disclosure 
reduces consumers’ willingness to purchase rebated products.  
Instead, the disclosures appear to backfire, increasing 
willingness to purchase rebated products.  Additional 
analyses show similar effects on consumers’ optimism about 
rebate redemption.  Neither disclosure reduces consumers’ 
optimism about the probability that they will redeem the 
rebate, and, in fact, the Redemption Rate Disclosure 
significantly increases this optimism.  Overall, our results 
indicate that not only is a disclosure-based regulatory 
approach unlikely to improve consumers’ rebate-related 
purchase decisions, it will likely harm consumers by making 
them even more optimistic about redemption, causing them to 
make poorer purchase decisions. 
In addition to the obvious practical significance of these 
results for the debate over how to improve consumers’ rebate-
related purchase decisions, our results sound a broader 
warning to lawmakers who have proposed other non-
restrictive regulations.  Many lawmakers favor non-
restrictive regulations such as mandatory disclosures because 
they believe that, even if mandatory disclosures do not help 
all consumers, such disclosures do no harm because 
consumers are free to ignore them.13  Our experiment shows 
that this belief is incorrect: mandatory disclosures—even 
those with strong intuitive support—can harm the very 
people they are intended to help. 
Our experimental results also speak to the likely 
effectiveness of other proposed disclosures that attempt to 
improve people’s choices by informing them about average 
outcomes or behaviors.  For example, scholars have proposed 
mandatory disclosures informing people buying gym 
memberships about average gym attendance statistics, 
because people buying gym memberships often vastly 
overestimate how often they will go to the gym.14  In our 
study, neither warning people about low rebate redemption 
rates nor warning them about consumers’ general tendency to 
be overly optimistic reduced their optimism about their own 
future rebate redemption. The disclosures appear to fail 
because they inform people about average consumer behavior, 
and most people believe they are better than average.  In 
 
 13. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 11, at 682. 
 14. Bar-Gill & Ferrari, supra note 4, at 106–07 (2010). 
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other words, people are overly optimistic about whether they 
are overly optimistic. Given that consumers reason this way, 
our results suggest that disclosures informing people about 
average behaviors might be similarly ineffective (or even 
harmful) in other contexts such as gym memberships. 
The remainder of this Article more thoroughly develops 
these ideas.  Part I discusses why firms offer mail-in rebates 
and why consumers fail to redeem them.  Part II presents 
possible regulatory approaches to reduce the number of 
consumers who fail to redeem rebates.  Part III reports the 
results of our experiment, and Part IV discusses these results 
and their implications for regulating mail-in rebate offers and 
for consumer disclosures in general. 
I. BACKGROUND & THEORY 
A. Why Do Companies Offer Mail-In Rebates? 
A mail-in rebate is a promotion in which a manufacturer 
or retailer refunds a portion of a product’s purchase price to 
consumers who purchase the product and later submit 
documentation regarding the purchase.15  Redeeming a rebate 
typically requires the consumer to mail materials such as a 
completed rebate form, the product’s UPC code, and the sales 
receipt to the rebate offeror or a rebate fulfillment center.16  
After the material is processed, a rebate check is sent to the 
consumer.17  For purposes of this Article, “mail-in rebates” 
also encompass rebate programs in which consumers can 
submit the required material via the internet rather than by 
mail, and those in which consumers receive something other 
than cash (e.g., a gift certificate) for redeeming the rebate.  
So-called “instant rebates” differ from mail-in rebates because 
instant rebates are discounts given at the time of purchase, 
 
 15. Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of 
Consumer Rebates, 12(2) STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 366 (2007) (defining a 
consumer rebate as a “delayed incentive offered by either a product 
manufacturer or retailer that requires consumers to:  (1) make a purchase at a 
pre-rebate shelf price; (2) submit a request for a refund amount by mail or the 
Internet to the rebate offeror, or a fulfillment center that processes rebates for 
the rebate offeror; and (3) wait some period of time after the purchase and 
rebate submission for the rebate offeror or its agent to send a rebate check or 
something of value . . . to the consumer.”). 
 16. Sandra Block, Rattled about rebate hassles?  Regulators starting to step 
in, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 2005, at B3.   
 17. Edwards, supra note 15, at 366.   
2015] INEFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES 411 
rather than at a later date, and typically do not require 
redemption effort by the consumer.18  Thus, an instant rebate 
is structurally more similar to a sale than to a mail-in rebate. 
Mail-in rebates are a popular promotional tool, although 
estimates of their use vary.  In 2004, Promotion Marketing 
Association (“PMA”) members estimated that consumers 
redeemed mail-in rebates totaling $487 million.19  A rebate 
consultant provides a higher estimate, stating that about 400 
million rebate checks worth $6 billion are mailed annually.20  
Rebates are especially common on certain types of consumer 
goods, such as electronics and computer-related products.21 
Mail-in rebates are popular for several reasons.  First, 
unlike coupons or sales, rebates allow the manufacturer or 
retailer to collect consumer information, such as names and 
addresses, which facilitates future marketing to those 
consumers.22  Second, a rebate does not require lowering the 
product’s nominal purchase price.  Thus, a rebate is less 
likely than a sale to create consumer resistance to the regular 
price when the promotion ends.23  Third, and perhaps most 
important, many rebate-induced purchasers later fail to 
redeem their rebates.  Promotion managers report rebate 
redemption rates of about 40% on consumer electronics, 
redemption rates of between 10% and 30% for $10–$20 
rebates on $100 software, and “very low” redemption rates on 
rebates under $10.24  A study by the PMA found an overall 
 
 18. Damon Darlin, Rebates On the Way to Expiring, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 
2006, at C1.   
 19. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1. 
 20. Betsy Spethmann, The Real Problem with Rebates, CHIEF MARKETER, 
(Jan. 11, 2006), http://chiefmarketer.com/othertactics/rebate_problems_011106.   
 21. Brian Grow, The Great Rebate Runaround, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, (Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/conten 
t/05_49/b3962074.htm. 
 22. Edwards, supra note 15, at 372. 
 23. Id.  See also Valerie Folkes and Rita D. Wheat, Consumers’ Price 
Perceptions of Promoted Products, 71  J. RETAILING 317, 326 (1995); Grow, 
supra note 21 (noting that consumer-product companies “pioneered rebates in 
the 1970s as a nifty way to advertise small discounts without actually marking 
the products down.”). 
 24. Silk & Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 5.  See also Johny Johansson, IN 
YOUR FACE:  HOW AMERICAN MARKETING EXCESS FUELS ANTI-AMERICANISM 52 
(2004) (“Redemption rates vary, but are generally low—less than 50% for big-
ticket technology goods, and as low as 2% for packaged goods.”).  Exact 
redemption rates are difficult to find because companies are reluctant to share 
redemption data.  For example, in a survey of rebate fulfillment center 
managers, 80% of the managers reported believing they would benefit from 
additional research on rebates, yet only 17% said they would be willing to 
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average redemption rate of only 21%, as a percentage of total 
dollar sales.25  In other words, consumers do not collect about 
four-fifths of the mail-in rebate dollars to which they are 
entitled. 
Not all failures to redeem rebates should concern 
policymakers.  Undoubtedly, some consumers buy rebated 
products not intending to redeem the rebates.  These 
“intended non-redeemers” likely disregard rebate offers when 
making their purchase decisions.26  Thus, rebate offers, like 
coupons, can be a form of price discrimination.  A rebate offer, 
in effect, allows two different prices to be charged to 
consumers: an after-rebate price to consumers who redeem 
the rebate and a pre-rebate price to consumers who do not 
redeem the rebate.27  This price discrimination can be 
efficient if more of the product is sold than would be if all 
consumers had to pay the same price.28 
However, rebate offers harm consumers who purchase a 
product because of the rebate but later fail to redeem it.  This 
phenomenon is commonly referred to as “breakage” or 
“slippage.”29  As noted above, the PMA estimated that 
approximately four-fifths of rebate dollars are not redeemed.  
It is unclear exactly how many non-redemptions stem from 
rebate-induced purchases, but the number is likely large.  
The PMA argues for using redemptions as a percentage of 
incremental sales (i.e., sales induced by the rebate offer) as a 
measure of the efficacy of a rebate offer.30  A PMA survey 
found this percentage to be 68%, suggesting that 
approximately a third of rebates from rebate-induced 
 
supply data on their past rebate promotions for an academic study.  Silk & 
Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 24–25, tbl.1. 
 25. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1. 
 26. Timothy G. Silk, Examining Purchase and Non-redemption of Mail-in 
Rebates: The Impact of Offer Variables on Consumers’ Subjective and Objective 
Probability of Redeeming 5 (May 2004) (unpublished PhD dissertation, 
University of Florida), http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0004380/silk_t.pdf).  
 27. Yuxin Chen, Sridhar Moorthy & Z. John Zhang, Price Discrimination 
After the Purchase:  Rebates as State-Dependent Discounts, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1131, 
1131 (2005). 
 28. Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice:  The Case Against Consumer 
Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 586–87 (2006).  
This argument assumes that consumers who are more price sensitive are more 
likely to redeem rebates.  However, survey evidence suggests that this might 
not be the case.  Rebates: Get What You Deserve, CONSUMER REP., Sept. 2009, at 
7. 
 29. Chen, Moorthy & Zhang, supra note 27, at 1131. 
 30. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1. 
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purchases are not redeemed.31  This calculation, however, 
likely overstates the redemption rate on rebate-induced 
purchases, because it assumes that all redemptions come 
from rebate-induced purchases.32  In reality, some 
redemptions are by “opportunistic redeemers”—consumers 
who would have purchased the product even in the absence of 
the rebate.33  Thus, the true redemption rate on rebate-
induced purchases is almost certainly lower than the two-
thirds suggested by the PMA.  Consistent with this, rebate 
fulfillment center managers estimate that more than half of 
non-redeemed rebates are attributable to consumers who 
intended to redeem the rebate.34 
In summary, many consumers who are induced to 
purchase products by mail-in rebate offers later fail to redeem 
those rebates.  We next discuss why this occurs. 
B. Why Do Consumers Fail to Redeem Rebates? 
There are many reasons why consumers who make 
rebate-induced purchases fail to follow through on their 
redemption plans:  they change their minds about whether 
the rebate reward is worth the redemption effort, 
procrastinate, forget about the rebate until the redemption 
deadline passes, or lose required redemption materials. 
1. Consumers Change Their Minds Regarding Whether 
to Redeem Rebates 
Mail-in rebates require consumers to make decisions at 
two points in time.  Consumers must first decide whether to 
purchase the rebated product.  Then, if they buy the product, 
they must later decide whether to redeem the rebate.  This 
time separation causes some consumers who buy a product 
intending to redeem the rebate to later change their minds 
and decide that the rebate award is not worth the redemption 
effort.  This likely occurs because, at the time of purchase, 
consumers overestimate the future utility from the rebate 
award and underestimate the future disutility from the 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Firms cannot calculate the true redemption rate on incremental sales 
because they cannot tell whether a redemption was from someone who would 
have purchased the product even in the absence of a rebate.  Silk & 
Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 7. 
 33. Silk, supra note 26, at 5. 
 34. Silk & Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 9, 25 tbl.1.   
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redemption effort. 
Overestimating the Future Utility from Rebate Awards.  
There are two possible reasons that consumers anticipate 
more utility from a rebate award at the time of purchase than 
they do at the time of the redemption decision.  First, the 
time delay increases the likelihood that consumers will 
decouple the product price and the rebate amount.  According 
to prospect theory, people value outcomes based on whether 
they represent gains or losses from a reference point,35 and 
the amount of utility people experience from a gain is lower 
than the amount of disutility they experience from an equal-
sized loss.36  At the time of purchase, most consumers likely 
aggregate the loss from the product price and the gain from 
the rebate award.  Consider a product with a $10 price and a 
$3 rebate.  If consumers net the $10 loss and the $3 gain at 
the time of purchase, the rebate will be viewed as a reduction 
in the loss from buying the product.37  When consumers make 
redemption decisions, however, enough time has passed that 
they often are no longer thinking about the product price.  
Thus, at that time, consumers view the rebate as a gain of $3 
rather than a $3 reduction of a loss.38  Because losses are 
more painful than gains are pleasurable, consumers will 
value the rebate award more at the time of purchase (when it 
reduces a loss) than at the time they make the redemption 
decision (when it creates a gain).39 
Two prior studies support the idea that a rebate’s 
monetary amount receives more weight in consumers’ 
purchase decisions than in their redemption decisions.  In one 
experiment, participants completed a survey regarding their 
movie preferences.40  They were told that in gratitude for 
completing the survey, a movie studio would sell them two 
discounted movie tickets.  Participants could choose to 
purchase the two tickets for a total of $11 or to purchase the 
two tickets for $13 with the right to receive a mail-in rebate.  
 
 35. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979). 
 36. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A 
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J.  ECON. 1039, 1039 (1991). 
 37. Sovern, supra note 4, at 1656. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Tim Silk, Getting Started is Half the Battle:  The Influence of Deadlines 
and Consumer Effort on Rebate Redemption 13–14 (undated) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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The amount of the rebate varied; some participants were 
offered a $6 rebate and others were offered a $9 rebate.41  The 
experiment found that participants were more likely to choose 
the rebated tickets when the rebate was $9 than when it was 
$6.42  However, the size of the rebate did not affect the 
likelihood that participants subsequently applied to redeem 
the rebate.43 
Another experimental study reported similar findings in 
a different setting.  In that study, participants completed a 
short survey in return for a dollar.44  At the end of the survey, 
they were told that instead of receiving the dollar, they could 
complete and mail in a second survey to receive higher 
compensation (either $2 or $4).45  Participants offered $4 were 
much more likely than those offered $2 to forego the initial 
dollar and take the second survey, but were not significantly 
more likely to mail in the second survey.46 
A second reason that consumers anticipate more utility 
from rebate awards at the time of purchase also stems from 
the decoupling of the rebate award and the purchase price 
that occurs over time.  At purchase, consumers’ expected 
utility from the rebate award is likely a function of both the 
absolute size of the award and its size relative to the 
product’s price.  As time passes, however, consumers are 
more likely to frame the award solely in absolute terms.  
Consider again a product with a $10 price and a $3 rebate.  
At the time of purchase, consumers experience utility related 
to the reward both in absolute terms (“this rebate saves me 
$3”) and in relative terms (“this rebate saves me almost a 
third of the purchase price”).  However, when consumers later 
decide whether to redeem the rebate, they are no longer 
thinking about the product’s price.  They therefore anticipate 
utility solely based on the award’s absolute magnitude.  In 
other words, at redemption, the rebate is viewed as merely $3 
rather than also as an impressive 30% of the purchase price.47  
 
 41. Id. at 14.   
 42. Id. at 18.   
 43. Id. at 18–19.   
 44. Dilip Soman, The Illusion of Delayed Incentives:  Evaluating Future 
Effort—Money Transactions, 35 J.  MARKETING RES. 427, 436 (1998). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 430–31. 
 47. Soman, supra note 44, at 436. (“[T]he face value of an incentive may 
appear large when framed against the cost of the product (e.g., prior to choice) 
but insignificantly small after the purchase.  This differential framing of the 
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In support of this idea, a study by the PMA found that 
“[i]ncremental sales gains [from a rebate] are influenced more 
by the size of the rebate relative to the list price [of the 
product] than by the absolute size of the rebate.  Redemption 
rates are influenced more by the absolute size of the rebate 
than by the size of the rebate relative to the list price.”48 
Taken together, the prior literature suggests that one 
reason consumers fail to redeem mail-in rebates is that they 
anticipate more utility from a rebate award at the time of 
purchase than they do when later deciding whether to redeem 
the rebate. 
Underestimating the Future Disutility of Redemption 
Effort.  Consumers also change their minds regarding 
whether to redeem rebates because they underestimate the 
future disutility associated with the redemption tasks.  
Again, this underestimation appears to stem from the delay 
between the product purchase decision and the rebate 
redemption decision.  Research shows that at the time of 
purchase, people overestimate the time they will have 
available for future redemption tasks.49  Further, people tend 
to underestimate the length and unpleasantness of future 
tasks.50  Thus, when deciding whether to purchase a rebated 
product, consumers likely underestimate the length and 
unpleasantness of the future tasks required to redeem the 
rebate (e.g., cutting out the UPC code, filling out the rebate 
form, and addressing and mailing the envelope) and 
overestimate the time they will have available for completing 
these tasks. 
Consumers underestimate the unpleasantness of future 
redemption effort at least partly because they tend to think 
abstractly about future tasks.51  Temporal construal theory 
suggests that activities that are temporally distant are 
 
face value could widen the discrepancy between choice and redemption rates.”). 
 48. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1.   
 49. Gal Zauberman & John G. Lynch, Jr., Resource Slack and Propensity to 
Discount Delayed Investments of Time Versus Money, 134(1) J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: GEN. 23, 30–31 (2005). 
 50. Robert A. Josephs & Eugene Hahn, Bias and Accuracy in Estimates of 
Task Duration, 61 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 202, 202 (1995); 
George Loewenstein, Out of Control:  Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 281–82 (1996).  See also Soman, 
supra note 44, at 429 (“there is broad consensus [in the behavioral decision 
theory literature] that the pain of future effort is underestimated.”). 
 51. Edwards, supra note 15, at 362, 394–95.   
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perceived as more abstract, while activities that are 
temporally close are perceived as more concrete.52  When 
consumers purchase a rebated product, rebate redemption 
effort is in the future, so consumers represent this effort as an 
abstract, high-level construal (i.e., they think about this effort 
only in broad, general terms).  At the time of the redemption 
decision, however, consumers represent the effort as a 
concrete, low-level construal (i.e., they think of the specific 
tasks they will need to perform to redeem the rebate).  When 
consumers think of the effort in more concrete terms, the 
effort looms larger than it did at the time of purchase.53 
Prior experimental evidence supports the idea that 
consumers underestimate the disutility of future redemption 
effort and, as a result, later fail to redeem rebates that they 
had anticipated redeeming.  In one experiment, participants 
chose between purchasing two similar products.54  One of the 
products did not offer a rebate.  The other product had a 
higher base price but offered a rebate that, if redeemed, made 
it the less expensive product.  Before making their choice, 
participants were told that they would need to drive to a 
nearby store to collect the rebate.55  The experiment varied 
the time between the product purchase and the required 
rebate redemption effort (i.e., people had to drive to the store 
the same weekend as the experiment or in 2–4 weeks) and 
varied the amount of effort required to redeem the rebate 
(i.e., either a 20-mile or 10-mile drive to the store).56  When 
the redemption effort had to be expended the same weekend 
as the purchase, the amount of redemption effort (i.e., 20- 
versus 10-mile drive) affected participants’ willingness to 
choose the rebated product.57  However, if there was a 
substantial delay before the redemption effort had to be 
expended, then the distance to the store did not affect 
participants’ product choices.58 
Another experiment in a different context confirms that 
consumers underestimate the future disutility of redemption 
 
 52. Yaacov Trope and Nira Liverman, Temporal Construal and Time-
Dependent Changes in Preference, 79(6)  J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 
877–78 (2000). 
 53. Soman, supra note 44, at 429. 
 54. Id. at 432–33.   
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 433.   
 57. Id. at 433–34. 
 58. Id. 
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effort.59  As discussed above, in that experiment, participants 
completed a short survey for a dollar.  After completing the 
questionnaire, participants could choose to forego the dollar 
and receive greater compensation in exchange for completing 
and returning a longer questionnaire in a few weeks.60  The 
experiment varied the length of the second questionnaire (i.e., 
the effort required to collect the greater compensation).61  The 
second questionnaire’s length did not affect participants’ 
willingness to give up the dollar for the second 
questionnaire,62 but it had a large effect on whether people 
later completed the second questionnaire.63 
In summary, some consumers fail to redeem rebates 
because they change their minds regarding whether the 
rebate award is worth the redemption effort.  This occurs 
because they anticipate more utility from the rebate award 
and less disutility from the redemption effort when making 
purchase decisions than they do when making redemption 
decisions.64 
 
2. Consumers Procrastinate, Forget About the Rebate, or 
Lose Redemption Materials 
Although some rebates are not redeemed because 
consumers change their minds, others are not redeemed 
because consumers procrastinate, forget about the rebate, or 
lose required redemption materials.  The time delay between 
the product purchase and rebate redemption is responsible 
for these phenomena as well.  Akerlof attributes 
procrastination to temporal differences in the salience of 
costs.65  Because the effort (i.e., cost) of completing a task in 
the present is more salient than the cost of completing it in 
the future, people postpone the task until a future day 
 
 59. Id. at 430. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 430. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 430–31 & fig.1. 
 64. Further evidence of this comes from the movie ticket experiment 
discussed above.  Silk, supra note 40.  Of participants who chose the rebated 
ticket offer yet later failed to redeem it, 8.3% stated that they failed to redeem 
the rebate because they “decided the money saved was not worth the effort 
required,” and another 12.5% stated that they started the redemption process 
but gave up because “it was too much work.”  Id. at 60 tbl.2.   
 65. George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 
3–4 (1991). 
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without foreseeing that, when that future day arrives, they 
will postpone the task again for the same reason.  Because 
rebate redemption effort occurs after the product purchase, 
mail-in rebates automatically start consumers down this 
procrastination road.66 
The delay between product purchase and rebate 
redemption also causes some consumers to forget to redeem 
the rebate.  Research has shown that “[d]elays or intervening 
activities that separate formation of an intention and the 
opportunity to act on the intention are likely to foster 
forgetting.”67  Procrastination and forgetting are intertwined; 
the longer consumers procrastinate, the more likely they are 
to forget to redeem the rebate.  In the movie ticket 
experiment, about half of participants who said they forgot to 
redeem the rebate stated that they had procrastinated before 
eventually forgetting.68  In addition, the longer that 
consumers procrastinate, the longer they have to misplace or 
accidently dispose of necessary rebate redemption materials, 
such as their receipt or UPC code. 
C. Why Don’t Consumers Anticipate that They Will Fail to 
Redeem Rebates? 
Procrastinating, forgetting, losing things, and 
misestimating utility from future rewards and effort are not 
unique to mail-in rebates—people experience them in other 
parts of their lives as well.  Given that people fall prey to 
these phenomena frequently and thus often experience the 
resulting negative consequences, why do they not learn from 
their past behaviors? 
The optimism bias provides a simple and powerful 
explanation for consumers’ failure to anticipate that they will 
fail to redeem a rebate. People are overoptimistic in a wide 
variety of contexts, from underestimating the probability of 
getting fired or divorced to overestimating the probability of 
outliving one’s peers.69  Overoptimism appears to persist even 
 
 66. Indeed, 47% percent of the participants in the movie ticket experiment 
who failed to redeem the rebate stated that they had procrastinated until the 
deadline for redeeming the rebate had passed.  Silk, supra note 40, 60 tbl.2. 
 67. Silk & Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 17.   
 68. Id.  In total, 13% of the movie ticket experiment participants who failed 
to redeem the rebate stated that they forgot to do so.  Silk, supra note 40, at 60 
tbl.2. 
 69. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 810 tbl.1 (1980).  See also Manju Puri & 
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after past failures.70 
In some contexts, being overly optimistic is beneficial.  
Optimism creates the illusion that people have more control 
over outcomes than they actually do, which gives them 
confidence they can achieve their goals.71  Studies have found, 
for example, that optimistic people are more likely to eat 
healthy food, exercise, and save for the future.72 
In other contexts, however, overoptimism leads to 
negative consequences.73  A recent experiment provides 
evidence of the negative consequences of overoptimism 
regarding rebate redemption.  In that study, consumers chose 
between a rebated product and a non-rebated product in a 
context where those who failed to redeem the rebate would 
have saved money by choosing the non-rebated product.74  
Participants who chose the rebated product estimated a 94% 
probability that they would redeem the rebate, but only 69% 
actually redeemed it.75 
Another recent paper offers an explanation for 
consumers’ overoptimism about future rebate redemption.  In 
that study, consumers were asked either to list reasons they 
might or might not redeem a rebate on a desired product.76  
Listing reasons for successful redemption did not affect 
consumers’ beliefs about the likelihood they would redeem the 
rebate.77  In contrast, consumers who were told to list reasons 
why they might not redeem the rebate estimated a 
 
David T. Robinson, Optimism and Economic Choice, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 79 
(2007). 
 70. Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin & Michael Ross, Exploring the “Planning 
Fallacy”: Why People Underestimate Their Task Completion Times, 67(3) J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 366, 379 (1994); Cade Massey, Joseph P. 
Simmons & David A. Armor, Hope Over Experience: Desirability and the 
Persistence of Optimism, 22(2) PSYCHOL. SCI. 274, 277 (2011). 
 71. Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-being: A 
Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
BULLETIN 193, 199 (1988). 
 72. Charles S. Carver, Michael F. Scheier & Suzanne C. Segerstrom, 
Optimism, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 879, 883–85 (2010).  See also Puri & 
Robinson, supra note 69, at 89. 
 73. See, e.g., Amanda J. Dillard, Amanda M. Midboe & William M. P. Klein, 
The Dark Side of Optimism: Unrealistic Optimism about Problems with Alcohol 
Predicts Subsequent Negative Event Experiences, 35 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1540, 1547 (2009). 
 74. Silk, supra note 40, at 23–25. 
 75. Id. at 25. 
 76. John T. Gourville & Dilip Soman, The Consumer Psychology of Mail-in 
Rebates, 20 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 147, 149 (2011).  
 77. Id. 
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significantly lower likelihood of rebate redemption.78  These 
results suggest that when consumers wish to purchase a 
rebated product, they naturally generate scenarios in their 
minds in which they will redeem the rebate, rather than 
scenarios in which they won’t do so.79  These positive 
scenarios, in turn, lead to overoptimism about the likelihood 
of redeeming. 
In summary, consumers appear to be overly optimistic 
about the likelihood they will redeem rebates.  This 
overoptimism, which appears to be the result of consumers’ 
tendency to focus too much on positive redemption scenarios, 
harms consumers by causing poor purchase decisions. These 
prior studies suggest one possible way to improve rebate-
related purchase decisions might be to provide disclosures 
that reduce consumers’ overoptimism by informing them 
about this general tendency toward overoptimism.  In the 
following section, we discuss this type of disclosure-based 
solution, as well as other possible regulatory approaches to 
reducing the number of rebate-induced purchasers who 
subsequently fail to redeem their rebates. 
II. POSSIBLE REGULATORY SOLUTIONS 
Several types of regulatory actions have been proposed to 
reduce the number of rebate-induced purchasers who fail to 
redeem their rebates (i.e., breakage).  These potential 
solutions vary in the extent to which they restrict consumer 
behavior.  They range from highly restrictive (e.g., prohibiting 
mail-in rebates) to moderately restrictive (e.g., prohibiting 
certain rebate terms) to nonrestrictive (e.g., mandating 
disclosures in rebate advertisements).  We discuss each 
category of solutions, with a special focus on the potential 
effects of nonrestrictive, disclosure-based solutions. 
A. Prohibiting Mail-In Rebates 
An extreme approach to addressing breakage is to 
prohibit mail-in rebate offers altogether.  In other words, 
regulators could mandate that any price discounts must be 
given at the time of purchase, or at least not be contingent on 
future consumer effort.  Lawmakers in Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and Delaware have introduced legislation 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 150. 
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banning mail-in rebates, although thus far, none of these bills 
have become law.80  Such legislation likely has failed to gain 
support because it would have some negative consequences.  
For instance, prohibiting mail-in rebates harms savvy 
consumers who do save money by redeeming rebates, 
interferes with consumer autonomy by limiting consumer 
choice,81 and eliminates a method of potentially efficient price 
discrimination.82 
B. Mandating or Prohibiting Rebate Terms 
Mandating rebate terms that increase redemption rates 
and prohibiting rebate terms that decrease redemption rates 
are less extreme regulatory interventions.  Redemption 
processes vary depending on the rebate offeror.  However, 
some are quite onerous and could be streamlined to make the 
process easier for consumers.83  For example, the redemption 
process would be less onerous if UPC codes, or any other 
portion of the product packaging required for redemption, 
were easy to find and remove and if consumers had easy 
access to redemption forms throughout the redemption 
period.  It is difficult to mandate product packaging due to 
the wide variety of products that offer rebates, but New York 
and Maine have passed laws requiring easier access to 
redemption forms.84  However, existing empirical evidence on 
how ease of redemption affects breakage is mixed,85 
suggesting a need for further research on the effectiveness of 
interventions related to the redemption process. 
One rebate feature that has been clearly demonstrated to 
affect redemption rates is the length of the redemption period 
(i.e., the amount of time consumers have to submit the rebate 
 
 80. H.B. 3670 (Ma. 2005) (prohibiting mail-in rebates); H.B. 167 (N.H. 2005) 
(prohibiting mail-in rebates); H.B. 389 (De. 1994) (prohibiting mail-in-rebates 
under $100). For a summary of rebate-related legislation, see Pechmann & Silk, 
supra note 3. 
 81. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 5–6, 11 (arguing that paternalistic 
interventions that preserve people’s freedom of choice are superior to those that 
restrict choice). 
 82. Chen, Moorthy & Zhang, supra note 27, at 1131. 
 83. Pechmann & Silk, supra note 3. 
 84. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1232 (2005); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 391-q 
(2006).  
 85. Soman, supra note 44, at 430–31 & fig.1 (experiment results suggesting 
that increasing required redemption effort increases breakage); Silk, supra note 
26, at 32, 34 fig.6. (experiment results finding that increasing required 
redemption effort decreases breakage). 
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materials).  Specifically, prior studies suggest that 
redemption rates decrease with longer redemption periods, 
probably because consumers are more likely to procrastinate, 
lose redemption materials, or forget.86  Thus less breakage 
should occur if regulations specified maximum redemption 
periods.  Though shorter redemption periods would likely 
reduce overall breakage, some individual consumers who 
would have redeemed within a longer redemption period 
might be unable to redeem in a shorter redemption period.  
Further, mandating short maximum redemption periods 
would probably be met with resistance from both consumers 
and policymakers because the idea that consumers benefit 
from a shorter redemption period is counterintuitive.87  In 
fact, in a misguided effort to protect consumers, some states 
have mandated minimum, rather than maximum, redemption 
periods.88 
C. Mandating Rebate Disclosures 
Though prohibiting mail-in rebates would eliminate 
breakage and mandating less onerous rebate terms might 
reduce breakage, those restrictive approaches also have 
significant downsides.  A less restrictive regulatory approach 
to breakage is mandating disclosures in rebate offers. Several 
prominent academics have argued that disclosure-based 
interventions that inform consumers about actual rebate 
redemption rates might improve purchase decisions without 
restricting consumer choice.89  However, others argue that a 
mandatory disclosure “should be considered only if 
experiments demonstrate that it will give rise to net long-
 
 86. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1 (finding that rebates with 
shorter redemption deadlines exhibit higher redemption rates).  See also, Silk, 
supra note 26, at 31–32, 34 fig.6 (experiment finding that a 1-day redemption 
deadline results in more consumers applying for their rebate than does either a 
7-day or 21-day redemption deadline). 
 87. This idea is counterintuitive even to industry members.  A survey of 
PMA members found that only 2.7% believe that longer redemption periods 
cause lower redemption rates.  REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1.  
In addition, the survey found a “strong consensus that . . . giving consumers 
more time to redeem increases redemption rates.”  Id.  
 88. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 391-q(3) (2005) (New York law requiring 
consumers to have at least 14 days after purchase to submit rebate redemption 
materials); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-40 (2007) (North Carolina law requiring 
consumers to have at least 30 days after purchase to submit rebate redemption 
materials). 
 89. See supra note 4. 
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term benefits.”90  This Article reports the results of our 
experiment that examines the effectiveness of a redemption 
rate disclosure, as well as the effectiveness of a more direct 
disclosure about overoptimism.91  However, before discussing 
these two disclosures and the reasons they might or might 
not be effective, we review prior studies that have 
investigated other disclosure-based solutions to breakage. 
1. Prior Literature on Disclosure-Based Approaches 
Most advertisements for rebated products emphasize the 
product’s after-rebate price.92  Other advertisements are more 
extreme, either omitting the before-rebate price entirely or 
failing to clearly state that the advertised savings is 
contingent on redeeming a mail-in rebate.93  Lawmakers in 
several states have passed laws that mandate how before- 
and after-rebate prices must be disclosed in advertisements.  
For example, California requires advertisements to 
prominently disclose the before-rebate price, the rebate 
amount, and the after-rebate price, and Connecticut prohibits 
advertising an after-rebate price at all.94  No prior research 
has explicitly examined the effects of California’s policy, but 
research in related areas suggests that requiring firms to 
emphasize the before-rebate price might backfire because this 
type of disclosure highlights a high reference price that 
consumers believe they will not end up paying.95  
Connecticut’s policy might be more effective.  A recent study 
shows that advertisements that disclose the before-rebate 
price, the rebate amount, and the after-rebate price induce 
more purchases than do advertisements that do not explicitly 
disclose the after-rebate price.96 
Another study examined the effects of disclosures that 
describe the redemption process and found that such 
disclosures are somewhat effective in reducing consumers’ 
 
 90. Green & Armstrong, supra note 11, at 302. 
 91. See infra Part III. 
 92. Hyeong M. Kim, Consumers’ Responses to Price Presentation Formats in 
Rebate Advertisements, 82(4) J. RETAILING 309, 310 (2006).  
 93. Id.  See also Pechmann & Silk, supra note 3. 
 94. Pechmann & Silk, supra note 3. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Sridar Moorthy & Dilip Soman, On the Marketing of Rebates: Having 
Your Cake and Eating It Too? 20 (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
authors). 
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tendency to purchase rebated products.97  Specifically, in an 
experiment, consumers chose between a rebated product and 
a non-rebated product, both before and after reading a 
disclosure that listed five key steps in rebate redemption.98  
This redemption process disclosure caused approximately 
20% of consumers who initially chose the rebated product to 
change their minds and choose the non-rebated product 
instead.99 
Taken together, these studies suggest that rebate-related 
disclosures might be a viable method for reducing breakage. 
Prohibiting after-rebate price disclosures and requiring 
redemption process disclosures are likely successful 
interventions because they address some of the underlying 
causes of consumers’ failure to redeem rebates.  For example, 
the redemption process disclosure addresses consumers’ 
tendency to underweight future effort by getting consumers to 
think carefully about future redemption effort at the time of 
purchase (i.e., making the construal of the future effort less 
abstract). 
In our experiment, we investigate the effectiveness of two 
disclosure-based solutions that attack a root cause of 
breakage: consumers’ overoptimism about the likelihood of 
redeeming mail-in rebates.100  One disclosure informs 
consumers about low historical redemption rates.101  The 
other disclosure is even more direct, warning that consumers 
often overestimate the probability of redemption and listing 
common reasons for redemption failures.102  In the remainder 
of this section, we discuss why these disclosures might or 
might not be effective in reducing consumers’ overoptimism 
and willingness to purchase rebated products. 
2. Redemption Rate Disclosure 
Mandatory disclosure of redemption rates in 
advertisements for rebated products might curb consumers’ 
overoptimism about redemption for at least two reasons.  
 
 97. Joel B. Cohen, Julia Belyavsky & Tim Silk (2008), Using Visualization 
to Alter the Balance Between Desirability and Feasibility During Choice, 18 J. 
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 270, 272–74 (2008). 
 98. Id. at 272. 
 99. Id. at 273–74. 
 100. See infra Part III. 
 101. See infra Part III.B. 
 102. Id.  
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First, the redemption rates might be lower than consumers 
presume, so this information might cause consumers to 
realize that they too are unlikely to redeem.  Second, even if 
consumers are already aware of low redemption rates, the 
disclosures might focus consumers’ attention on those rates 
and provide a low anchor for consumers’ estimates of their 
own probability of redemption.103 
Little research has examined the impact of disclosures 
that inform consumers about average consumer behaviors.  
However, a recent study in a different domain suggests these 
disclosures might be effective.  In that study, payday loan 
borrowers were provided with a disclosure about the 
surprisingly long period of time that it takes the typical 
borrower to repay a payday loan.  Specifically, the disclosure 
stated that “[o]ut of 10 typical people taking out a new 
payday loan. . . 2½ people will pay it back without renewing, 
2 people will renew 1 or 2 times, 1½ people will renew 3 or 4 
times, 4 people will renew 5 or more times.”104  This 
disclosure reduced the amount borrowed by 17%.105 
Though the results of that study are encouraging, the 
effectiveness of redemption rate disclosures is not a foregone 
conclusion.  There are several reasons why redemption rate 
disclosures might fail to temper consumers’ optimism.  First, 
consumers might fail to read the disclosures.  Second, even if 
consumers read them, the disclosures might fail to provide 
consumers with new information.106  Third, even if the 
disclosures provide new information, consumers might believe 
that information about average consumer behavior tells them 
little about their own future behavior.  Indeed, studies in 
 
 103. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974). 
 104. Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive 
Biases and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. FIN 1865, 1872–73 (2011). 
 105. Id. at 1881–84. 
 106. The payday loan study found that people underestimated the average 
time it takes borrowers to repay a payday loan. Id. at 1878–79.  In contrast, the 
movie ticket experiment described earlier suggests that consumers might 
overestimate only their own likelihood of redeeming a rebate, not average 
redemption rates.  There was significant overoptimism in participants’ 
estimates of their own probability of redemption.  On average, participants who 
chose the rebated tickets estimated a 94% probability that they themselves 
would redeem the rebate, yet only 69% of them actually later redeemed it. Silk, 
supra note 40, at 25.  However, participants who chose the rebated tickets also 
estimated that only 54% of participants who chose the rebate offer would 
redeem the rebate, suggesting that they are already aware of low average 
redemption rates.  Id. 
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other domains find that people tend to underutilize general 
base rate information  (e.g., information about typical 
outcomes and behaviors) when predicting their own outcomes 
and behaviors.107 
Thus far, we have outlined why redemption rate 
disclosures might or might not be effective in reducing 
consumers’ overoptimism and willingness to purchase rebated 
products.  However, prior research suggests a third possibility 
as well: redemption rate disclosures could boomerang and 
increase consumers’ desire to purchase rebated products.108  
Some warning disclosures, especially those issued by 
authoritative sources, appear to backfire and increase the 
very behaviors they are meant to discourage.  For example, 
studies show that warning labels can increase, rather than 
decrease, drinking and driving,109 interest in violent films and 
television programs,110 and desire to eat high-fat foods.111 
Most studies explain these boomerang effects using 
Brehm’s112 theory of psychological reactance.113  “Reactance” 
is a motivational state that occurs when a consumer feels that 
his or her freedom of choice is threatened.114  Consumers 
respond negatively to perceived threats to their freedom of 
choice and, as a result, can become more attracted to the 
threatened attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors.115  In our 
experiment, participants might feel that the disclosure is 
pressuring them to change their beliefs about the likelihood of 
rebate redemption and/or the desirability of the rebated 
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product.  If so, the disclosure could backfire and ultimately 
increase consumers’ desire to purchase the rebated product. 
3. Overoptimism Disclosure 
Scholars have focused on redemption rate disclosures as 
a way to reduce consumers’ suboptimal purchase decisions 
induced by mail-in rebates.116  As discussed above, there is 
some support for the idea that a redemption rate disclosure 
will temper consumers’ optimism about the likelihood of 
rebate redemption,117 but there are also reasons to believe 
that such a disclosure might be ineffective or even harmful.118  
Thus, we also test the effectiveness of a stronger disclosure 
that directly informs consumers that, “people often 
overestimate the probability that they will redeem a mail-in 
rebate because they fail to anticipate that they will forget, 
procrastinate, lose the necessary materials, or later decide it 
is not worth the effort.” 
The process underlying optimism is neurologically-
based,119 which makes it particularly hard to change.120  
However, prior research in psychology suggests that one way 
to combat overoptimism is to ask people to list 
“counterfactuals” (i.e., reasons that that they might not be 
successful).121  A recent experiment demonstrates the 
effectiveness of this technique in the rebate realm—
consumers who were asked to list reasons why they might not 
redeem a mail-in rebate were significantly less likely to want 
to purchase the rebated product.122  Though it is unrealistic to 
 
 116. See supra note 4. 
 117. Bertrand & Morse, supra note 104, at 1881–84. 
 118. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 11, at 665–79; Green & Armstrong, 
supra note 11, at 302; Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 11, at 429; Ringold, 
supra note 12, at 51–52. 
 119. Tali Sharot, Alison M. Riccardi, Candace M. Raio & Elizabeth A. Phelps, 
Neural Mechanisms Mediating Optimism Bias, NATURE, November 1, 2007, at 
102, 103. 
 120. Hal R. Arkes, Cost and Benefits of Judgment Errors:  Implications for 
Debiasing, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 486, 493 (1991) (doubting that warning people 
about an unconscious cognitive bias would be an effective debiasing technique 
because “[i]t would be difficult for subjects to abort a cognitive process that 
occurs outside of their awareness.”). 
 121. Asher Koriat, Sarah Lichtenstein and Baruch Fischhoff, Reasons for 
Confidence, 6(2) J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 
111 (1980); Stephen J. Hoch, Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in 
Predicting Personal Events, 11(4) J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, 
MEMORY, & COGNITION 719, 725 (1985). 
 122. Gourville & Soman, supra note 76, at 149. 
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mandate that consumers write such a list prior to purchasing 
a rebated product, lawmakers could mandate disclosures that 
provide counterfactuals to consumers.  Thus, our study tests 
the effectiveness of a stronger disclosure listing the reasons 
consumers fail to redeem rebates. 
Although this disclosure relies on a mechanism that has 
successfully reduced overoptimism in other domains, it 
suffers from some of the same limitations as disclosing 
redemption rates:  consumers may fail to read the disclosure, 
and, even if they do read it, they may believe that the reasons 
other consumers fail to redeem rebates do not apply to 
themselves.  In other words, consumers may be overly 
optimistic about whether they are overly optimistic.  Further, 
like the redemption rate disclosure, this disclosure could 
result in psychological reactance and a resulting increase in 
consumers’ desire to purchase the rebated product.  In fact, to 
the extent that consumers perceive the overoptimism 
disclosure as a warning, rather than an informational 
disclosure, this disclosure might be even more likely to 
backfire than is the redemption rate disclosure.123 
In summary, prior studies suggest that redemption rate 
and overoptimism disclosures could decrease, increase, or 
have no effect on consumers’ overoptimism and willingness to 
purchase rebated products.  This uncertainty regarding the 
benefits of such disclosures indicates that empirical evidence 
on their effectiveness is necessary.124  In the following section, 
we describe our experiment, which provides such evidence. 
III. THE EXPERIMENT:  TESTING REBATE DISCLOSURES 
A. Participants 
Five hundred forty-nine U.S. citizens recruited by Toluna 
USA, a market research firm, participated in the 
experiment.125  Participants appeared to be familiar with and 
influenced by rebate offers.  Eighty-two percent of them 
reported having previously seen an advertisement for a 
product offering a mail-in rebate.  Ninety-one percent had 
purchased a product offering a mail-in rebate before, and 73% 
of those stated that a rebate offer influenced their most recent 
 
 123. Bushman & Stack, supra note 110, at 223. 
 124. Green & Armstrong, supra note 11, at 302. 
 125. TOLUNA, http://www.toluna-group.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
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purchase of a rebated product. 
Demographic information for the study participants, as 
well as comparison data for the general U.S. adult population, 
is provided in Table 1.  The table shows that the participants 
are a diverse group, ranging in age from 18–88, with a variety 
of racial/ethnic backgrounds and education and income levels.  
Our participants are fairly representative of the general U.S. 
population, although the sample includes a higher proportion 
of females, a lower proportion of racial/ethnic minorities, a 
slightly lower median household income, and is slightly older 
and better educated than the general population. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Demographic Data on Experimental Participants 
  Experimental 
Participants 
 U.S. Adult 
Populationa  
Gender     
     Male  34%  48% 
     Female  66%  52% 
Age     
     18 to 39 years old  27%  37% 
     40 to 59 years old  47%  38% 
     60 to 79 years old   25%  20% 
     80 or older  1%  5% 
Race/Ethnicity     
     African American (Non-
Hispanic) 
 9%  12% 
     Asian  4%  5% 
     White (Non-Hispanic)  81%  65% 
     Hispanic or Latino  4%  16% 
     Native American  1%  < 1% 
     Other  1%  1-2% 
Highest Education Level 
Achieved 
    
     No high school degree  2%  13% 
     High school degree  24%  31% 
     Some college  30%  17% 
     College degree  28%  28% 
     Some graduate school  5%  n/a 
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     Graduate degree  11%  11% 
Household Income     
     Less than $25,000  23%  25% 
     Between $25,000 and 
$49,999 
 32%  25% 
     Between $50,000 and 
$74,999 
 19%  18% 
     Between $75,000 and 
$99,999 
 8%  12% 
     $100,000 or more  10%  20% 
     Prefer not to answer  8%  n/a 
a Data for U.S. Adult Population from the U.S. Census website 
(http://www.census.gov/).  Gender, age, and race/ethnicity are based on 2010 
census data, and education level and household income are based on 2009 
census data.  We were not able to find race/ethnicity data stratified by age, so 
the data for race/ethnicity includes children as well as adults.  U.S. population 
growth is lower for White (Non-Hispanic) than for some other racial categories, 
so eliminating children would likely result in a higher percentage of people in 
the White (Non-Hispanic) category. 
 
 A logistic regression with the five demographic variables 
as independent variables and product choice as the dependent 
variable finds that only Race/Ethnicity is a significant 
predictor of participants’ product choice (χ2 = 5.32, p = 0.02).  
When we run a full-factorial logistic regression with the 
Race/Ethnicity variable and our two manipulated variables 
(the rebate disclosures) as independent variables and product 
choice as the dependent variable, we find that Race/Ethnicity 
does not interact with either of our manipulated variables (all 
p > 0.10).  This suggests that, although Race/Ethnicity affects 
the general propensity to choose the rebated product (perhaps 
due to different brand loyalties), it does not affect how 
participants respond to rebate disclosures. 
B. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Toluna USA administered the experiment online and 
compensated participants with points that could later be 
converted into prizes.  Participants began by viewing an 
advertisement for two portable DVD players:  a Panasonic 
DVD player and a Sony DVD player (see Figure 1).126  The 
 
 126. To prevent order effects, we randomized the order that the two DVD 
players appeared in the advertisement and the order of the response 
possibilities for the choice dependent measure. 
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Panasonic DVD player was priced at $169.99.  The Sony was 
priced at $179.99 with a $40 mail-in rebate, for an after-
rebate price of $139.99.  We wanted most participants to 
prefer the Panasonic in the absence of a mail-in rebate offer 
on the Sony; this allowed the rebate to induce an increase in 
the percentage of people who chose the Sony.  Consequently, 
we set the product features so that the Panasonic DVD player 
was slightly better than the Sony (e.g., 8-hour battery for the 
Panasonic versus 7-hour battery for the Sony). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Sample Advertisements from Experimental Materials 
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After reviewing the advertisement, participants indicated 
which DVD player they would be more likely to purchase.  
Participants also answered two questions that capture their 
optimism about rebate redemption.  Specifically, we follow 
Weinstein’s seminal paper, which measured optimism as the 
difference between a person’s perceptions of their own and 
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others’ chances of experiencing an event.127 We therefore 
asked participants to assess: (a) the probability that they 
themselves would redeem the rebate and (b) the probability 
that others who purchased the rebated product would redeem 
the rebate.  Finally, participants answered a number of 
demographic and manipulation check questions. 
1. Experimental Conditions 
The experiment has a 2 × 2 design:  we manipulated 
whether consumers received a Redemption Rate Disclosure 
(Yes, No) and an Overoptimism Disclosure (Yes, No).  In other 
words, there were four experimental conditions.  The 
advertisement in the Yes Redemption Rate Disclosure/No 
Overoptimism Disclosure condition contained only the 
redemption rate disclosure.  The advertisement in the No 
Redemption Rate Disclosure/Yes Overoptimism Disclosure 
condition contained only the overoptimism disclosure.  The 
advertisement in the Yes Redemption Rate Disclosure/Yes 
Overoptimism Disclosure condition contained both 
disclosures, and the advertisement in the No Redemption 
Rate Disclosure/No Overoptimism Disclosure condition 
contained neither disclosure. 
In the Yes Redemption Rate Disclosure conditions, the 
advertisement contained a disclosure stating, “[o]ur sales 
records show rebate redemption rates of approximately 30% 
for rebates of this type and size.”  We chose a 30% redemption 
rate because it should be low enough to reduce rebate-induced 
purchases if participants believe the 30% base rate applies to 
them128 and it is high enough to be believable.129  
Advertisements in the Yes Overoptimism Disclosure 
conditions contained the disclosure “[s]tudies show that people 
often overestimate the probability that they will redeem a 
mail-in rebate because they fail to anticipate that they will 
 
 127. Weinstein, supra note 69, at 809. 
 128. For participants who believed that they had only a 30% chance of 
redeeming the rebate, the expected cost of the rebated Sony DVD player to them 
would be $167.99 (i.e., the $179.99 before-rebate price minus 30% multiplied by 
the $40 rebate).  Because the Panasonic DVD player has slightly better 
features, costs almost the same ($169.99), and doesn’t require redeeming a 
rebate, we anticipated that most such participants would buy the Panasonic 
instead. 
 129. Silk & Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 5 (promotion managers report 
rebate redemption rates of about 40% on consumer electronics and between 
10%–30% on $10–$20 rebates on $100 software). 
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forget, procrastinate, lose the necessary materials, or later 
decide it is not worth the effort.” 
2. Control Conditions 
In addition to the four experimental conditions, there 
were three control conditions.  In the Full Price control 
condition, the Sony DVD player did not offer a rebate; it 
merely had a price of $179.99.  Because the Panasonic had 
slightly better features and a price of $169.99, we expected 
most participants in the Full Price condition to prefer the 
Panasonic.  Indeed, only 25% of participants in the Full Price 
condition chose the Sony DVD player over the Panasonic.  
This number provides an important baseline:  if more than 
25% of participants chose the Sony in any of the four rebate 
conditions, this suggests that the rebate offer influenced 
product choice in that condition. 
In the second control condition, the Sale Price condition, 
the Sony product offered an instant savings of $40 (i.e., a 
sale), rather than a $40 mail-in rebate.  We expected more 
participants to prefer the Sony in this condition because, 
although the Panasonic had slightly better features, the on-
sale Sony was $30 cheaper than the Panasonic.  Indeed, 65% 
of participants in the Sale Price condition chose the Sony.  
This condition also provides an important baseline.  Sixty-five 
percent of consumers chose the Sony when no effort was 
required to get the $40 savings, so if fewer than 65% of 
participants in any of the rebate conditions choose the Sony, 
this suggests that the effort associated with rebate 
redemption influenced consumers’ purchase decisions. 
The experiment also included one final control condition.  
If rebate disclosures are ineffective, it is important to know if 
this is because participants fail to read the disclosures or 
because they deem the disclosures irrelevant.  Thus, the 
experiment also included a condition where the Sony DVD 
player offered a rebate, but instead of one of the rebate 
disclosures, the advertisement contained a non-rebate 
disclosure that we expected to play a role in consumers’ 
product choice:  “This DVD player has been refurbished by the 
manufacturer to like-new condition.”  This Refurbished 
Disclosure had the identical font size, color, and location as 
the rebate disclosures in the other experimental conditions.  
If participants did not respond to any of the disclosures, 
including the Refurbished Disclosure, this would suggest that 
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participants tend to ignore disclosures at the bottom of 
advertisements.  However, if participants ignored the rebate 
disclosures but responded negatively to the Refurbished 
Disclosure, this would suggest that they notice the rebate 
disclosures but deem them irrelevant. 
C. Results 
Panel A of Figure 2 displays the percentage of 
participants who chose the rebated product in each 
experimental condition.  As the figure shows, neither the 
Redemption Rate Disclosure nor the Overoptimism Disclosure 
reduced the proportion of consumers who chose the rebated 
product.  Indeed, the disclosures appear to have had the 
opposite effect.  Forty-six percent of experimental 
participants who received neither disclosure chose the 
rebated Sony DVD player, compared with 55% who received 
the Redemption Rate Disclosure, 59% who received the 
Overoptimism Disclosure, and 72% who received both 
disclosures.130  Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of a 
logistic regression that formally tests whether these 
differences are statistically significant.  This analysis 
confirms that both disclosures significantly increased 
participants’ willingness to purchase the rebated product 
(Redemption Rate Disclosure: χ2 = 3.94, p = 0.05; 
Overoptimism Disclosure: χ2 = 7.95, p < 0.01). 
We next compare the percentage of people who chose the 
rebated product in the experimental conditions with those in 
the control conditions.  Comparisons with the Full Price 
control condition, where the Sony DVD player did not have 
any sales promotion, suggest that the rebate offer increased 
the product’s attractiveness to consumers.  Only 25% of 
consumers in the Full Price condition chose the Sony DVD 
player, compared to 46% to 72% in the experimental 
conditions where the Sony DVD player had a $40 rebate offer 
(all p ≤ 0.01). 
Comparisons with the Sale Price condition, where the 
Sony offered a $40 instant savings instead of a rebate, 
suggest that consumers are somewhat sensitive to future 
redemption effort at the time of purchase, but only in the 
absence of rebate disclosures.  Specifically, 65% of 
 
 130. Results of a smaller pilot test on 76 undergraduate students showed a 
similar pattern of results. 
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participants in the Sale Price condition choose the Sony, 
compared to 46% in the experimental condition where 
consumers received no rebate disclosures (Z = 2.47, p = 0.01).  
However, in the three experimental conditions where 
consumers viewed rebate disclosures, consumers were not 
significantly less likely to purchase the Sony DVD player 
when the $40 saving was in the form of a rebate rather than 
an instant savings (all p > 0.10).  Thus, any sensitivity 
consumers have to future redemption effort at the time of 
purchase appears to be largely offset by the negative 
boomerang effect of the rebate disclosures. 
 
TABLE 2 
Regression Results 
 
  Panel A: Logistic Regression Results for Choice 
Dependent Measure 
 df β Wald χ2 p-
value 
Redemption Rate Disclosure  1 0.46 3.94 0.05 
Overoptimism Disclosure 1 0.66 7.95 < 0.01 
Redemption Rate Disclosure × 
Overopt. Disclosure 
1 0.19 0.17 0.68 
 
 
  Panel B: ANOVA Results for Optimism Dependent 
Measure 
 df MSE F-
Statistic 
p-
value 
Redemption Rate Disclosure  1 9,706.59 11.60 < 0.01 
Overoptimism Disclosure 1 635.90 0.76 0.38 
Redemption Rate Disclosure × 
Overopt. Disclosure 
1 1894.24 2.26 0.13 
Panel A of Table 2 reports logistic regression results with the percentage of 
participants who chose the rebated product as the dependent variable and the 
presence of the Redemption Rate and Overoptimism Disclosures as categorical 
independent variables.  Panel B reports ANOVA results with participants’ 
Optimism scores as the dependent variable and the presence of the Redemption 
Rate and Overoptimism Disclosures as independent variables.  The Optimism 
measure was calculated by subtracting each participant’s assessment of the 
probability that others would redeem the rebate from the participant’s 
assessment of the probability that they themselves would redeem the rebate.   
 
 
FIGURE 2 
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Effects of Rebate Disclosure on Product Choice and 
Optimism 
 
 
 
Our experiment measures participants’ assessments of 
their willingness to purchase products rather than their 
actual purchase decisions.  As such, it is possible that 
participants did not focus on the experiment and that the 
rebate disclosures’ ineffectiveness is a result of this.  
However, the fact that the disclosures cause a boomerang 
effect, rather than no effect, helps rule out this possibility.  If 
participants were not paying attention, the disclosures would 
have had no effect on their choices.  As further evidence, 
participants responded very negatively to a disclosure with 
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identical formatting and placement that disclosed that the 
rebated product was refurbished.  Specifically, only 21% of 
participants in the Refurbished Disclosure control condition 
chose the Sony player.  This result suggests that the absence 
of similar negative reactions to the rebate disclosures is likely 
not due to a lack of care or an unwillingness to read 
disclosures at the bottom of advertisements. 
Our theory suggests that breakage results from 
consumers’ overoptimism about future rebate redemption, so 
we also examine the effects of the rebate disclosures on 
participants’ optimism.  We capture participants’ optimism by 
asking them to assess the probability that other consumers 
who purchased the Sony would redeem the rebate and the 
probability that they themselves would redeem the rebate if 
they were to purchase the Sony.  We then compute a measure 
of each participant’s optimism by subtracting their assessed 
probability of others’ redemptions from their assessed 
probability of their own redemption.  Panel B of Figure 2 
reports the level of optimism across conditions and shows 
that the rebate disclosures actually increase, rather than 
decrease, consumer optimism.  Specifically, we observe an 
optimism score of 23% for participants who viewed neither 
disclosure, 31% for participants who viewed only the 
Overoptimism Disclosure, 39% for participants who viewed 
only the Redemption Rate Disclosure, and 37% for 
participants who viewed both disclosures.  An ANOVA, which 
tests whether these differences are statistically significant, 
(see Panel B of Table 2) shows that the increase in optimism 
for those who viewed the Redemption Rate Disclosure is 
statistically significant (F = 11.60, p < 0.01) but the increase 
for those who viewed the Overoptimism Disclosure is not (F = 
0.76, p > 0.10).  Given these effects on consumer optimism, it 
is unsurprising that the disclosures increased, rather than 
decreased, the percentage of consumers who chose the 
rebated product. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSION 
Lawmakers and academics often propose mandatory 
disclosures as the primary method of consumer protection.131  
Mandatory disclosures are popular because they are generally 
 
 131. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 11, at 652, 681–84. 
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considered to be the cheapest and easiest-to-implement fix.132  
Further, many lawmakers mistakenly believe that even if 
disclosure-based solutions do not help, they cannot hurt.133  
That is, unlike other regulatory approaches, mandatory 
disclosures do not restrict consumer behavior because 
consumers are free to ignore the disclosures.  Consequently, 
many lawmakers assume that such disclosures will have 
either, (a) a positive effect, if consumers are influenced by the 
disclosures, or (b) no effect, if consumers are not influenced by 
the disclosures.  Our results provide support for a third 
alternative–that disclosures can harm consumers–and 
highlight the potential danger of using mandatory disclosures 
to improve consumer decision-making. 
We examined the effects of two rebate disclosures on the 
optimism and rebate-related purchase decisions of a large, 
diverse set of consumers.  One disclosure informed consumers 
about low rebate redemption rates and the other informed 
consumers about their overoptimism.  We found that the both 
disclosures were not only ineffective, they were harmful: the 
disclosures generally increased, rather than decreased, 
consumer optimism and the percentage of consumers who 
chose the rebated product. 
Our study is not the first to demonstrate these types of 
boomerang effects in response to mandatory disclosures.  
Prior research suggests that warning disclosures, especially 
those issued by authoritative sources, sometimes increase 
undesirable behaviors.134  Brehm’s reactance theory135 is the 
most common explanation for boomerang effects.136  If 
consumers who are warned not to engage in a behavior 
believe that their freedom of choice is being threatened, 
reactance theory predicts that they will respond by becoming 
more attracted to the threatened alternative.137  In our rebate 
setting, it is perhaps less surprising that the Overoptimism 
Disclosure, which explicitly warned consumers about the 
reasons people fail to redeem rebates, caused reactance.  
However, our Redemption Rate Disclosure was much subtler, 
 
 132. Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on 
Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 3 (2005) 
 133. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 11, at 682. 
 134. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 135. Brehm, supra note 112. 
 136. Ringold, supra note 12, at 42–43. 
 137. Clee & Wicklund, supra note 114, at 391–93. 
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simply informing consumers about low redemption rates.  
Despite this, consumers responded almost as negatively to 
the implicit warning contained in the Redemption Rate 
Disclosure as they did to the more heavy-handed 
Overoptimism Disclosure. 
Regardless of the reason for the disclosures’ perverse 
effects on consumers’ purchase decisions, one thing is clear: 
these types of disclosures are not a viable solution for 
policymakers trying to curb consumers’ overoptimism about 
rebate redemption.  Further, our results highlight the 
importance of empirical study of any proposed disclosure 
before implementation.  Prior to our study, there were good 
reasons to believe that redemption rate disclosures might be 
an effective way to reduce breakage, and, as such, these 
disclosures were an oft-proposed solution.  Rebate disclosures 
are likely not the only regulatory solution with subtle 
unanticipated negative effects, making empirical 
investigation critical. 
 
